Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen

Estonia is a natural gateway; a gateway between East and West, between North and South. For centuries it has been a place where cultures, traditions and languages meet and intermingle. It has always been a place where Estonians have lived together with Germans, Swedes, Russians, Jews and other peoples. Estonia has always been a part of the world community - except for the past fifty years, when an iron curtain cut us off from our natural environment of the Baltic Sea nations.

Today once again Estonia is able to fully integrate herself again in the community of Baltic Sea nations, which stretches from Denmark and Northern Germany to Finland and also includes Norway and Iceland. We wish to play a full and active part and that is why we also wish to become members of NATO, which unites North America with Europe, and of the European Union, which in turn unites Europe.

In my speech today I will focus on NATO, provide a brief overview of our relationship with the EU, and finally also touch upon some aspects of our relationship with Russia, which after all is our large neighbour and your important partner.

First, NATO. The enlargement of the Alliance is not an aim in itself. In fact, it does not cease to surprise me how many people still view NATO enlargement in terms of the Cold War, as a zero-sum game between the West and Russia. These people tend to underestimate the degree of change and the new spirit of freedom, which is now embracing most of Europe. This new spirit includes the right of the people of Estonia and other countries of the Central and Eastern Europe to decide which organisations they would like to join. That is why the decision of numerous Central European countries to join NATO is crucial, as it is a clear indication of the readiness of those nations to assume part of the obligations of managing today's changing world.

The technical difficulties of enlargement, such as financial ones, should be weighted against the consequences of denying access to these democracies. NATO can provide these countries not only with security, but also with perceived security, as my good friend Bronislaw Geremek, Foreign Minister of Poland, has made clear. The perception of leaving a zone of instability and entering a zone of stability, democracy and prosperity virtually guarantees that the countries admitted to NATO membership will concentrate on issues of the future, rather than on the wounds of the past. Reconciliation through security as Zbigniew Brzezinski calls it, and nobody can say it better.

Russia naturally does play an important role in this equation. I believe we all recognise the progress that Russia, as a former Soviet dictatorship, has made in the course of attempting to develop a market economy, free press and institutions of political democracy. We also agree that much needs to be done to reach a true civil society and establish a fully functioning rule of law. Most importantly, virtually all Russians share this opinion. Estonia has supported and will continue to support Russia on this difficult path. Russia has also not been left alone or out in the cold by the international community which has provided Russia with billions of dollars in aid, membership in the new G-8, membership in the informal, but increasingly vital, Contact Group, and with a special arrangement with NATO. To describe Moscow as having been left alone, and to describe NATO enlargement as the only issue influencing bilateral ties, would be an unfair and inaccurate characterisation of Russia's relations with the world community.

NATO has been drawn deeply into solving today's international problems and as a consequence Russia's view of the Alliance is changing. Certainly, there is still a great deal of animosity, but I believe that a political process has been initiated which changes the perception of NATO in Russia. Accordingly, neighbours' acceding to NATO is not viewed by Moscow anymore with such panic and animosity, as it would have once been. NATO is a present-day reality, and while Russia will probably not support the second and third wave of NATO enlargement, it will probably not seriously oppose it either.

Where should then NATO draw its borders? That was a question posed by a London Financial Times editorial a couple of days ago. It is a legitimate question for strategists who like to theorise about the new world order, but it can easily be answered in the real world, as NATO is a community of values and only those, who both in theory and practice embrace those values, can be allowed to join. In the real world that would logically mean countries, which are also ripe for entry into the European Union, which has a precise set of criteria to measure the level of civic society and market economy in its applicants.

While I applaud the attempts of the US administration to set certain military criteria for the entry of new members, I also caution against an approach of excluding future Denmarks, Norways, Luxemburgs and Belgiums. While every nation should do its utmost to contribute to common defence, the size of the territory and population cannot serve as a pretext for excluding a country. Where we to take this approach we would contradict the basic principles of indivisibility of security. NATO is not only a well-oiled military machine - seen from only this vantagepoint accepting any new members at all is pointless - but it is also a political and strategic community, a community based on common values. Were we to forget that, we would be in trouble.

I would view it as positive if every present and future member of the EU also had a realistic chance of joining NATO. It would above all provide a real and practical foundation for building a European defence dimension, which would allow Europe to take more responsibility for crisis areas in its neighbourhood. It would also contribute to the creation of a more balanced relationship between the European Union and the United States. This is a strategic relationship which is of essential importance to both Transatlantic and world security.

This brings me to my second point.

For us the European Union and NATO are two sides of the same coin. They stand for the same values, the same principles, the same ideals. That is why Estonia, like the other Central European countries aspiring to NATO membership, also wishes to become a member of the European Union. In fact, on this front we have so far got further than with NATO, as our negotiations for full membership are well under way. Estonia's economic progress, which has made it into one of the best-performing countries in Central Europe, was the catalyst for the European Union's decision to initiate accession negotiations with us. To date the negotiations are running well and Estonia's internal preparations for membership - which entail the translation and adoption into Estonian law of 80 000 pages of Community legislation - are well on track. Our own domestic work is planned in a way, which will allow us to be ready for accession to the EU on 1 January 2003. Becoming a member of the European Union will give Estonia a seat at the table and I hope that the accession process will provide an additional impetus also to our NATO aspirations.

Now I turn to my third and last point, Russia and our relationship with this great country.

Neither the United States nor the neighbours of Russia have found it easy to deal with Russia over the past years. I do not believe I say anything revolutionary if I predict that the next few years will not be any easier. We have to face the unfortunate reality that Russia is and will be going through difficult times and that it is impossible for the outside world to impose its solutions on Russia. What we both - Estonia and the United States - in our own way can do is to continue engaging Russia and not to give up on Russia. That would be the worst thing we could do.

Estonia's policy, as I already mentioned, has for many years been one of "constructive engagement". We have always realised that it will be difficult to achieve truly good political relations as long as Russia itself is still in turmoil. Being nice to Estonia costs a certain political price in today's Moscow. In response to this we have focused on the pragmatic and practical aspects of bilateral relations, such as trade relations and cultural exchange. In fact our relations in all areas are almost normal, considering the domestic economic and political situation in Russia. Indeed, also our political relations are improving, as emphasised by last weeks initialling of the new border treaty between Estonia and Russia.

Russia to us is and will continue to be an important neighbour and trading partner. We see Estonia as a gateway both to and from Russia. I am also convinced that Estonia, together with Finland and our two Baltic neighbours, Latvia and Lithuania, will be the driving forces in the EU for the implementation of policies which aim to tie in Russia. After all, as neighbours, we are most interested of all in a stable, democratic and prosperous Russia.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have provided you with an overview of our thoughts on NATO enlargement, on our future EU membership and on our relationship with Russia. For us they are all part of the same scheme; of Estonia's re-entry into the Euro-Atlantic community, of rebuilding our place as a gateway between east and west, north and south.

Thank you!

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