NATO and Europe: agenda for the coming years


Recent developments in Europe have fundamentally changed the European security landscape. We are dealing now with democratic Russia and with free and democratic Ukraine, and soon with the enlarged NATO and European Union. With some exceptions, liberalized or even free trade prevails in Europe. As majority of the experts note, classical Cold War security risks are unlikely to emerge any time soon.

NATO has energetically built a community of institutions, like EAPC, NATO-Russia Council, and NATO-Ukraine consultation mechanism. But granting full membership to countries in Central Europe should remain a major priority of the Alliance, since this is an essential element of NATO-s quest for a more stable security environment.

NATO has seriously redefined its missions in Europe and is engaged in likely combat situations in Bosnia and soon possibly in Kosovo. NATO would like to be as fit and energetic as possible. It has become a major vehicle in consulting the Russians and mustering the big power consensus on the western front, NATO has undeniably become the supporting pillar of the new European security structure.

Enlargement must continue

In 1999, when new members will be accepted to the Alliance, some analysts would certainly like to depict NATO enlargement as a one-time event, almost a laps of history, which was due to internal political reasons in Germany and the United States. They will try to reason that no obvious rationale exists for continuing the enlargement to include other Central-European aspirants. Such an approach would prove a fundamental misunderstanding of the present Europe.

NATO-s new members will establish platforms of security and stability in the regions which were formerly considered to be under the Soviet influence. That is why issues like economic well-being, development of the civil society and the Rule of Law are so important in deliberations over new members. For this reason it is crucial to look to both North and South when contemplating the next round of NATO enlargement New members are ambassadors, whose positive record should reinforce changes in the region. They are ''well-connected'' relatives, who can act with greater authority in solving regional issues.

Therefore it is not surprising that the relationship with the European Union is deemed so important for the new aspirants. I would certainly not connect the two organizations, or make one prerequisite to the other. I would rather point out that the political fitness of the new members is mostly judged under the EU criteria, which the latter has worked out in much greater detail than the Alliance. NATO, of course, includes military criteria, but they concern the structural and educational development of our armed forces rather than the hardware. As some analysts have put it: ''NATO has enough tanks already''.

The unification of Europe is and remains to be the key issue. NATO has a crucial role here, since it offers the highest form of interdependency, interdependency in possible conflicts. Article 5 is the strongest statement of unity which the western community can give, demanding in return sensible, low profile behaviour, logical for a member of the defence union. This is what the stability in Europe is all about.

The Alliance is fairly justified to inquire what contribution could small countries offer to smooth its operations? Apart from political and symbolic value, there are practical issues where we can help. Small countries are sometimes crucial in mustering political consensus by adding their voices to the chorus. It is well-known, how important the Benelux countries have been in keeping the European Union up and running. Today, one is better off having members whose security depends vitally on having a strong, prestigious and active Alliance.

Possible conflicts and internal divisions might potentially be a problem when you look at the big powers of the Alliance. The presence of Slovenia, Estonia or Lithuania could encourage rather than discourage a consensus.

Recent experience with India and Pakistan shows us, how important it is that countries were included in a wider system of security. Denationalization of defence, emphasizing the collective will rather than independent defence interests, is an important part of providing security in the new Europe, in the continent, where ferocious wars have usually begun - wars which have expanded far beyond the borders of this continent.

In addition, small members of the Alliance play a crucial role in avoiding non-traditional risks like proliferation of nuclear materials, chemical and bacteriological materials and relevant expertise. Coupled with the resources of the Alliance, small countries might make a crucial difference in solving these problems. Various forms of terrorism, including modern cyberterrorism, will also find powerful opponents with new members of the Alliance.

Those are new aspects of security, which have not yet gained the attention of the public. However, I am happy to note that they were discussed at length between the US and Nordic and Baltic defence ministers, when they met two weeks ago in Copenhagen.

Our security environment

Mr. Chairman, the security environment in the Baltic Sea region has improved considerably, and according to the criteria set out in the Enlargement Study, this should provide a good background for further enlargement in the North. There are colleagues, who have decided to change the criteria along the way and are pointing out that since nothing threatens us, there is really no rush in integrating us to the Alliance. As we have agreed with the three invited countries, threat is not a rationale behind the enlargement.

The peaceful, stable and economically booming nature of the Nordic-Baltic region is an important part of building the new Europe. The well-being of the Baltic States is a vital part of Europe's stability. We have been actively pursuing the policy of positive engagement with Russia, and our own relations, as well as those of our neighbours, have been steadily improving. The European Union has made an important step towards the region by inviting Estonia to the accession negotiations and committing to invite Latvia and Lithuania soon.

The Baltic states and the Nordic countries have lately further improved their security environment by actively participating in the debate for regional Security and Confidence Building Measures. Russia, Germany and a number of other countries have made proposals to facilitate that process. Estonia has , together with its partners, emphasized that we would not like to have a special framework for the Baltic region, but rather a general ''menu'' of CSBM-s, agreed by the whole of OSCE . Various subregions could then choose CSBM-s for their own region without cutting themselves off from the generally agreed framework.

Strategic importance of the Nordic-Baltic region has been seriously enhanced after the end of the Cold War. In the geopolitical sense the region has become one of the major ''points of contacts'' with Russia both for the European Union and also for NATO. The United States have signed the Baltic Charter with the Baltic countries, declaring their ''real, profound and enduring interest'' to the security of the Baltic states.The United States have promoted a Northern Initiative, designed to include Russia to a wider web of economic co-operation. The European Union is promoting the program of Northern Dimension, designed to erase economic differences between members and non-members in the region. All this , coupled with the activities of the Council of Baltic Sea States, is creating an atmosphere of trust and co-operation.

Russia and the Alliance

Mr. Chairman, one of the issues, still under lively debate is Russia-s relationship with the Alliance. This relationship could be described as ambivalent. Events in Bosnia and in Kosovo have shown, that the Alliance is an important partner for Russia, one with whom Russia can work in solving the difficult questions of our time. NATO and Russia are still trying to find the best procedures to pursue their co-operation, but there is a general positive approach. I believe such an approach can only be enhanced by a larger, wider Alliance with Central-European countries included in it.

The future members of the European Union will participate in formulating the Common Foreign and Security Policy anyhow. Thus it is only natural that they should also participate in the Trans-Atlantic policy making and should have a word in NATO-Russia Council. This, needless to say, is an additional argument for the membership in the Alliance.

Russians have never elaborated what actually makes them uncomfortable in the continued enlargement and why they have, in contradiction to their general policy of reinforcing OSCE institutions, gone against the principle of the freedom of choice of any country to decide its security arrangements. NATO should not accept such an attitude, it should try to explain again and again why enlargement has a positive impact way beyond the borders of those countries who will be accepted. Russian resistance must not be seen as a natural phenomenon, unless we have lost faith in Russian democracy.

Zbigniew Brzezinski has provided an excellent argument by saying that NATO enlargement is reconciliation through security. The relationship between those Central European countries and Russia will change fundamentally. Countries like Poland have no reason to evoke their historic memory, Russian nationalist forces, which are still visible in the Russian Duma, have no reasons to wake theirs.

Let's be honest. Under President Jeltsin's leadership Russia's democracy and economy have had the chance to develop. While I pray that those who come after him could have a similar vision, as a pragmatist I also acknowledge that they might have a different one. It will be our job in 1999 to design the European Security system in such a fashion that it does not rely on a good will of any leader in the east or in the west, regardless of our personal sympathies.

If Washington summit of 1999 implies that in the mind of the international community, spheres of influence still exist, those who really want them to reappear will have a good starting position. We must work to make their starting position absolutely hopeless.

Balts as allies

Mr. Chairman, when we get down to the nuts and bolts of NATO membership, one of the practical key issues is the development of defence forces in Estonia and the other Baltic States. Balts are reliable allies when it comes to conflict solving. They have done well in training exercises, in Bosnia and anywhere else, where they have been given a chance to show themselves. Granted, they cannot muster the defence forces of Poland. But there is no doubt that they would fiercely oppose any attempts to subject them to a foreign rule. Whenever one believes the task of occupying the Baltic states to be easy, one makes a classical mistake of discounting the defence, based on popular determination. It is based on a principle: ''You can destroy us, but you can never conquer us''.

Problems with the Baltic defence have by now been clearly worded in the special studies written by a number of the Allied countries about the Baltic defence forces. It is positively surprising that when you bring in military specialists and ask them to make a hardheaded assessment of our problems and ways to solve them, they will come up with reasonable plans and ideas. I am happy to note, that the defence model based on popular resistance very similar to that of other Nordic States has gained appreciation among the military whose own equipment includes Tomahawks and radar-evading air-planes.

All three countries are in the process of adopting systematic plans which would guarantee the steady improvement of their defence forces for years to come. They will be part of the community of countries, whose armed forces are transparent and democratically built A number of joint projects already connect them with each other and with other countries of the Western community. Among them BALTNET, the Baltic air control and surveillance system, joint Baltic Defence College, as well as their integration to the Nordic-Polish Brigade in Bosnia have proved the Balts to be viable for joint action.

As small countries, the Baltic states should boldly assess in which branches of warfare they could offer some qualitatively new aspects to NATO. While it would be difficult to use our popular army for NATO tasks beyond our borders, it would be equally difficult to keep large amounts of infantry in total readiness. So for example, in Estonia we might think about the experience of Luxembourg in providing reconnaissance and special forces support for the Alliance. In those tasks, even a smaller force can make a considerable difference.

Conclusions

In conclusion, ladies and gentlemen, let me remind you once again that the enlargement of the Alliance is one of the major tools of instituting change in Europe. While other aspects of changing the Alliance are important: EAPC, relations with Russia, relations with Ukraine etc, the strongest message of the non-divisibility of Europe is conveyed by allowing the new aspirants to join article 4 and article 5 of the Alliance. In Madrid, the Alliance committed itself to a strategy of continuos enlargement. Changing that strategy would send a number of wrong signals and be against the logic of contemporary Europe.

The Baltic states in particular stand out among those for whom the continuation of the declared policy is vital. The importance of the Baltic states far exceeds their richness in mineral resources, their population or the size of their territory. Richard Holbrooke puts it well in his Wall Street Journal commentary titled: ''NATO-s next frontier. The Baltics''. He says: ''We should not shrink from their (the Baltics) desire for membership in NATO. It is necessary that we stand up to the challenge and support them. The issue of Baltic security is perhaps the hardest piece in the NATO enlargement puzzle. It's a political and moral litmustest of our strategy to build a peaceful, democratic and undivided Europe.''

Holbrooke recognizes that the Baltic countries occupy a special role in the western policy-making. His own country, together with many others , never recognized the illegal annexation of the Baltic states to the Soviet Union. Many western countries invested a considerable political capital during the end of eighties and the beginning of nineties in the liberation of the Baltic states. By the way: this happened before the fall-apart of the Soviet Union, so the independence of the Baltic states has been recognized by the Soviet Union as well as other countries.

Mr. Chairman, I believe, we are in the right path. When I signed with US President Clinton a Baltic-US Charter in Washington, President Clinton said in his speech: ''This (charter) underscores America's commitment to help create conditions under which the Baltic states will one day walk through the open door''.

I have reason to believe that other countries share this commitment.

Thank You!

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