Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is my sincere pleasure to be here today at the Examination Schools as part of my visit to the United Kingdom, and in conjunction with the celebration of the eightieth anniversary of Estonia's independence.

Ever since I was a boy, I have wanted to visit Oxford. As some of you might know, my father, George Meri, was a diplomat. But he was also a translator of great literature into the Estonian language. After he was released for the third time from a Soviet prison, he devoted the rest of his life to translating. Among others, he translated Shakespeare, making the works of the bard available for Estonians in seven beautiful volumes. He was short, of course, of modern commentaries. So he wrote to the Blackwell's bookshop in Oxford proposing a deal: He was to send copies of Russian classics in return for modern editions of Shakespeare. He got a brief negative reply, from Blackwell's. But some days later, a private letter arrived from an employee of the Blackwell's, Mr. Shaw. What was impossible officially, was possible privately.

I have read the postcard correspondence about this arrangement, with exact figures of calculated cost. You see, anything more sophisticated, any thought would have never passed the Soviet censorship. Somehow it has caused me to ponder the significance of seemingly insignificant encounters. It has made me wonder about the hidden ties that bind diplomats and literati and ordinary readers.

It has also made me wonder about the power of coincidence in politics. As you know, last December in Luxembourg, the European Union invited Estonia, along with four other states, to be part of the first group of aspirants to begin accession negotiations. Serendipity may be at work here, but if not, it is in any case symbolic that Estonia will begin these negotiations while its old friend, the United Kingdom, chairs the European Union.

I use the term 'old friend' because Estonia's relations with your country have been good, indeed, from the very beginning, eighty-some years ago. Between the wars, we were big trading partners, with nearly forty percent of Estonia's exports coming to Great Britain.

We were military partners as well. Much of Estonia's arms during our War of Independence came from the U.K., and British warships engaged in battle during that time in the Gulf of Finland. This aid alone played a crucial strategic role in achieving our independence.

But I believe that the United Kingdom, as a NATO member state, has a crucial role to play today in maintaining security in post-Cold War Europe.

Traditionally, speeches at Estonian Independence Day celebrations include references to armored trains, like those used in the War of Independence. I will not speak about armored trains, but a modern variant thereof, namely of umbrellas, of NATO umbrellas, that is, of collective security.

As you surely know, one of Estonia's major foreign policy goals is full membership in NATO. This seems utopian to some, but we Estonians are accustomed to being called stubborn. We take much pleasure in proving the naysayers wrong.

There are plenty of naysayers with regards to NATO. We are regularly hearing the following admonitions: it cannot be done; you are indefensible; you are too close to Russia; Russia will object and then what will become of Europe?

I would counter by saying that it CAN be done and I believe that it WILL happen. Specifically, I would submit to you the following three theses. First, NATO has enlarged before and is enlarging now, so it follows that it will enlarge again in the future. Second, Estonia and the Baltic states do not differ significantly in their readiness or ability to join NATO from the three East European states now set to be the next new members. And third, the greatest obstacle to Estonia's and the Baltic states'aspirations for NATO membership lie not in Moscow but in the West.

I will begin with the first thesis. Back in 1949, in the context of a rather complicated and threatening situation in Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. In the beginning, NATO had 12 members, but in 1952, Greece and Turkey joined. In 1955, after the Federal Republic of Germany was formed, Germany joined. And in 1982, Spain became a member, bringing NATO to its present day total of 16 member states.

Naturally, we understand that the current enlargement is politically more highly charged than earlier expansions because the three new members are former members of the Warsaw Pact.

When the USSR disintegrated and the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, NATO planners were faced with having to think up new and creative solutions to the security problem in Europe. Some had no idea where to go, but fortunately for us, NATO's General Secretary then was Manfred Wörner, a real visionary who promptly set out to enlarge eastward.

In 1994, the result of much of this interim thinking was unveiled in NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative. The program was intended to give the West a breather in order to figure out where to go next; to give Eastern Europe some experience in dealing with the Alliance as well as hope that there would be a next step; and to give the Russian Federation an opportunity to get used to the idea that NATO, the former enemy, could become a friend.

Judging by the imminent enlargement, Partnership for Peace was a successful program. The lesson is, in any case, clear: through the years, NATO has changed in response to a changed environment. It follows, then, that NATO is capable of changing now and again in the future.

My second thesis is that Estonia and the Baltic states do not differ significantly from the three Eastern European states that have been invited to join NATO. From an economic and democratization point of view, there are few differences. This is demonstrated in the move by the European Union to include Estonia along with Slovenia and the three new NATO members, in the first group to join the EU.

In terms of defensibility, there are also few differences, if one overlooks geography. And actually, when we speak of the differences, we are only really speaking of geography. Many assume that because the Baltic states are situated on Russia's border, the West must be overly careful when there is any talk of NATO membership for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

Lately, however, this geopolitical thinking has changed. Last July, during the NATO summit in Madrid, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic were formally invited to join NATO. But the final communiqué of that meeting had something for the Baltic states, as well. In what is fairly radical wording for NATO, the communiqué said that all states are free to choose their security arrangements regardless of geography.

These words are downright seismic in their potential. In effect, this wording signals the end of the concept of spheres-of-influence in Western security thinking. If implemented, this wording puts the Baltic states on an even playing field with the Visegrad Three. And if those three are about to become NATO members, it is not out of the realm of possibility that the Baltic states can one day, too.

My third thesis is fairly radical in content, at least in some Western circles. Namely, I would posit that the greatest obstacle to Baltic membership in NATO lies not in Moscow, but in the West.

Increasingly, we hear statements and analysis from Moscow that if the Baltic states were to become NATO members, the Russian Federation would be forced to re-think its policy toward NATO. The most recent such statement was just last week on Thursday from Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

But let us consider this once more. When negotiations were going on about the nuts and bolts of uniting Germany in 1991, the then-still existent USSR was dead set against having a united Germany inside NATO. But the West held firm, and now the larger FRG is part of NATO.

When the three Visegrad countries made known their wish to join NATO, Russia was against the move. But once again, the West held firm, and undertook an extensive educational campaign to convince Russia that this move would not endanger Russia.

Herein lies the crux of the problem: if the West stays its course that the Baltics should one day become NATO members; if the West undertakes the same kind of campaign of reassurances and confidence building as it did with the Visegrad states, then gradually Russia will come to accept this point of view. As I told Nezavisimaya Gazeta last week, Russia's problem with NATO is largely psychological in nature. It is not a real fear that pervades, but a fear of the unknown. Western states have come to terms with this fear before, and I am confident that they will do so in the future, as well.

The Baltic question is, of course, much more complex than that of the Visegrad states. But there are already signals that Western thinking about the role of the Baltic states in European security is changing. Perhaps the most recent signal is in the signing last month of the US-Baltic Charter by the three Baltic presidents and U.S. President, which crystallized the Madrid wording in a specifically American way.

One thing is clear: the question of Baltic membership in NATO will not be decided in Moscow, but in London and Brussels and Berlin and Paris and Washington.

Next year in April, NATO will celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO's hope is that by that time, all 16 current and the three future NATO member states will by then have ratified the amendment to the NATO treaty and all 19 can celebrate as equal partners. But responsibility for security in Europe will not end with celebrations. NATO enlargement should be a project whose aim is to provide peace of mind through added security to all countries of Central and Eastern and Western and Northern Europe. Estonia, well on its way to the European Union, hopes to be celebrating too.

Thank you for your attention.

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