Misters Chairmen,
Members,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is an honour and a privilege to speak before this group of distinguished and influential individuals known as the Trilateral Commission. Through the years, in the area of public policy, the Trilateral Commission has come to be synonymous with excellence itself. Like other presidents, I, too, am frequently called upon to address all sorts of fora for all kinds of reasons. Rarely, however, have I had the chance to make Estonia's case before a joint gathering of the leading opinion-makers from Japan, Europe and North America. I thank you for this opportunity.

Ladies and Gentlemen, in graphic terms, and by its very definition, the Trilateral Commission refers to the strategic triangle formed of three land-masses: Japan, Europe and North America. The concept of using shapes as allegories for strategy is not new. We recall Zbigniew Brzezinski's "Arcs of Destablilisation" or may remind ourselves of early post-Cold War thoughts on the evolving European security structure, which was envisioned as a series of concentric circles, much like those formed when a pebble is tossed into a pool of water.

It should come as no surprise to anyone, then, that we in Estonia also think of our strategic reality in geometric terms. Instead of land-masses or continents as points, however, we see certain cities -- or, more precisely, particular institutions located in certain cities -- as having special significance for our future. And instead of three points, we have four. Our Strategic Quadrangle, if you will, consists of lines drawn between and among Tallinn, Brussels, Washington and Moscow.

It is easy to understand why this is so. If our security depends on normalisation of relation with Russia, on the one hand, and integration with trans-Atlantic structures, on the other, then the decision made in these four capitals take on a special significance for us.

You may know that Estonians are a small but persevering people. We are highly self-sufficient and individualistic, some would even say stubborn. This means that we believe first and foremost in helping ourselves before turning to others.

At the same time, history has taught us to be realists. Since we regained our independence in 1991, we have been doing our utmost to enhance our security. We have come to an historic juncture now, however, in which activity at the other three points of the quadrangle can support our own efforts. In other words, I would argue that our security depends at least as much on the actions of others as on our own performance.

Before I turn to mathematics, allow me to stop for a moment at our own efforts to enhance security. As any student of international relations knows, the ultimate source of foreign policy is in domestic politics. In Estonia, since 1991, the two major internal factors affecting how we view of the outside as well as how others' view us have been free-market reforms and our re-creation of democracy, otherwise known as the rule of law.

Our performance in the first area has been, if I may say it, quite remarkable. Estonians are rather modest people, so we prefer to refer to ourselves using a term coined by Newsweek magazine as The Little Country That Could. Others say that our economic policies would make even Milton Friedman blush.

These policies have borne fruit. If four years ago over 90% of our trade went East, then today, the bulk of our foreign trade -- two thirds -- are with Western countries. We have utilised the few foreign loans we have taken -- and we have loan resereves. Our policy is trade, not aid. Foreign investments continue to double every six months, and exports are up. Our currency, the Estonian kroon is pegged 8 to 1 with German Mark and our foreign currency reserves have more than tripled since kroon was introduced in 1992. We have a balanced state budget and actual growth in the GDP. Our low taxation and full repatriation of profits for foreigners doing business in Estonia make us increasingly attractive to investors.

Our progress in the second area, that of re-building democracy, has been no less speedy. In the three-and-one-half years since independence was re-established, we wrote and passed by referendum a new constitution to assure that Estonia would be a state based on the rule of law. We have succeeded in re-creating state institutions responsive to the public and answerable to the constitution. We have adopted 430 laws since October 1992 - practically all basic laws have been enforced by now.

Last month, we conducted our second post-Communist elections, deemed free and fair by international observers. The great changes we have undergone have had domestic political implications, as the election results demonstrate. The people voted overwhelmingly for staying the course of free-market reforms, but with what perhaps could be called a greater social component. It is vital to note that no extremist groups, either from those with a Communist legacy or those from the right, got into parliament. Just as important, Estonia's growing citizenry of Russian origin actively exercised the right to vote. In fact, the one Russian political party standing for elections was one of only seven parties or lists to garner the minimum 5% needed to pass into parliament. There are also representatives of different minorities in several party groups in the parliament.

This is an accomplishment which bespeaks of another great part of our democratic efforts, namely the construction of a fair and just nationality policy based on political participation for all who have demonstrated loyalty to the state. In Estonia, permanently residing foreigners are participating in local elections. The cornerstone of this nationality policy is our citizenship law, which has been hailed as one of the most liberal in Europe.

These efforts both in free-market and democratic reforms have left their mark in security terms. Today, we belong to a number of the universal and regional organisations most vital to enhancing security, and are moving closer to others. Not to mention the UN, we are also full members of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. We are moving rapidly toward the European Union. Last year we concluded Free Trade Agreement with the European Union which foresaw no transition period. More importantly, however, is our association agreement with the Union, which we initialed just two weeks ago in Brussels and which we will sign in May. I am proud to say that our Europe Agreement is the first among those concluded between the EU and Central European states that has no transition period.

Moreover, we continue to be active participants in the NATO's NACC forum and the Partnership for Peace. The centerpiece of our PfP involvement is peacekeeping. Along with our Latvian and Lithuanian neighbours, we have formed a joint Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion which has captured the imagination of alliance planners. A number of the countries represented here have provided invaluable help in building up the battalion, and it is paying off Estonia's first Blue Helmets are due to return soon from Croatia, where they served and trained under the auspices of a Danish company, as has the Lithuanian company.

All of this means that the Brussels and Washington points of the Strategic Quadrangle I referred to earlier are fully operational. In other words, we might be more secure now that we were three-and-one-half years ago. But are we? This abundance of organisations we are now part of, this web that ties us to the West, has even prompted some observers to argue that we have achieve the implicit security guarantees necessary to protect and maintain our sovereignty and independence, and that we need not seek additional assurances.

This is where I disagree. We need to go much further West before my country feels secure. This approach, I might add, does not just come out of our historical place in Europe. On the contrary, there are direct security implications of our pro-Western stance. Both at home and abroad, we have been asked at times why we were and are so interested in full membership in the European Union and NATO.

Why, indeed? The answer is rather straightforward. According to an Associated Press report of 18 April, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has declared: "In certain cases, the use of direct military force might be necessary to protect our compatriots abroad." In a special mention of Estonia and Latvia, Mr. Kozyrev accused these states of pursuing a "deliberate policy of banishing ethnic Russians".

Ladies and Gentlemen, I can assure you that there have been no changes in the status of ethnic Russians in Estonia to justify this unexpected and dramatic statement. On the contrary, over a few recent years the former tensions in Estonia have dropped abruptly. This is a unique achievement not only in Central Europe, but in Europe as a whole. You should not overlook that - in the past - ethnic issues in Estonia were complicated. Since the beginning of Soviet occupation in 1940 the Kremlin conducted regular "ethnic cleansing" in Estonia during half a century, which was manifested in the killing and deportation of Estonians, in the massive deliberative influx of people of other nationalities and in the forcible transformation of national culture. Memories of such tragic losses won't vanish overnight. But they will vanish. And every tragedy ends with the soul having been purified. I was twelve years old when my family and I myself were in the middle of the night deported to Siberia. Now I can understand the misery of both the prisoners and the prison-keepers. They had food, but they were blind. We went hungry, but we had hope.

Today, there is hope for everybody in Estonia. Estonian legislation has opened a path for the aliens to integrate into the Estonian society. Everyone has the freedom of choosing their citizenship. This was observed repeatedly by international missions which carried out thorough and all-round scrutiny of our human rights situation. The fact that Russians don't feel discriminated against in Estonia was revealed by a recent survey carried out here by the Moscow-based Russian Minorities Research Centre. Findings were that 67% of the Russians living in Estonia are not in favour of a restoration of the Soviet Union, and 59% agree that Estonia should remain a sovereign state. Only 2% of the Russians living in Estonia wish to emigrate from the country.

Last month, US Vice President Al Gore visited Tallinn briefly. While there, before a crowd of waving American and Estonian flags in our medieval Town Hall Square, he paid tribute to the success of our nationality policy by saying, and I quote, "History teaches us that national independence can in some places stimulate national chauvinism. Yet Estonia's fair implementation of its citizenship law and political participation of Estonian citizens of Russian origin show that Estonia is becoming a state rooted in law, tolerance and based on modern civic values. In this demonstration of tolerance, Estonia is a model for the rest of the world" (end of quote).

We place great importance on the political dialogue associated with European Union membership and the implications of the Common Foreign and Security Policy for European security and stability. We also see NATO through this filter. The best security, as far as we are concerned, is one based on economic success, but backed by military assurances. For us, every Western dollar invested in Estonia is a dollar spent on defence. In other words, by expanding the EU and NATO, we are creating a kind of enlarged Zone of Prosperity that can benefit all.

This security aspect is why we believe that EU and NATO enlargement should happen according to objective criteria and not on a group-by-group basis. This is not only to our advantage, but will enhance security on the continent as well. If some countries were to join up while others were relegated to a kind of waiting room, we would accentuate the very situation we are seeking to avoid, namely, a potentially unstable politico-security gray zone between Western Europe and Russia which could be seen by some as being "up for grabs".

This reference to gray zones brings me to the final point of the Strategic Quadrangle, namely to Moscow. As you know, last August 31, our relations with Russia took a decisive turn for the better when the last occupying troops left Estonian soil. Since that time, we have embarked upon a policy we are calling Positive Engagement, which means that we have sought to take advantage of the historical opportunity to improve relations with our giant neighbour by lowering the level of rhetoric and working toward normalisation. The key to this policy is mutuality, however. If both sides do not engage in civilised behaviour in the international arena, we can hardly take advantage of this duty to make peace between ourselves.

Estonia tries to find solutions to the most demanding problems in its relations with Russia. We do not have territorial claims to Russia, but there must be good will on the part of both sides to conclude a border treaty.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I spoke earlier of Estonia's Strategic Quadrangle. There is another kind of quadrangle of strategic sort with which we are all familiar, and that is the window. Speaking more precisely, this is a window of opportunity. Right now, the states represented here face an historic opportunity to prop open this window to consolidate the gains of 1989 and to ensure that this continent never again has to shiver in cold winds.

To forego this challenge is to shirk duty and lose influence.

Ladies, and gentlemen, I would like to recall an open letter signed by a host of political luminaries, many of them members of this organisation, and published in September 1993 in The Wall Street Journal, entitled "What the West Must Do in Bosnia." I quote from the letter: "Even if, like Kuwait in August 1990, all Bosnia ... were seized, it would be essential for the democracies to make clear, as they did in the case of Kuwait, that violent border changes and ethnic cleansing will not stand. If the West does not make that clear, it will have nothing persuasive to say to the Croats and the Serbs who have already renewed the conflict Serbia started two years ago. Finally the West will have nothing to say to discourage the now serious threats presented by pan-nationalists in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere" (end of quote).

Today, a Jekyll-and-Hyde-like danger lurks in classical democracy. Through CNN, ABC and countless other channels, the present-day world intrudes into bedrooms, living rooms and kitchens, creating the illusion that everyone is participant in video reality. But television programmes do not allow individuals to make their voices be heard in the solving of problems.

And problems are not in the jurisdiction of just one electorate anymore. Today, global problems need twenty, thirty, even fifty years to be solved. Unfortunately, immediate needs are often made priorities. The voter continues to elect, above all, the person who can promise his family a new car. And this is the crisis in Western democracy. There is no mechanism that would instil into people worry and concern about their children's future.

The threat of aggression has not disappeared either. Aggression, since prehistoric times, has been an attempt of one population, one tribe, one state, to derive additional energy at the expense of another. Aggression is an extensive policy instead of an intensive one. As a remnant of the Soviet empire, such an extensive policy continues to fester in Russia, but it exists elsewhere as well. Where democracy should be growing, there is instead the threat of terrorists redistributing national resources by nuclear extortion.

In spite of all this, we are gathered here at this Trilateral Commission meeting with optimism that World War II will never happen again. I would like to quote from the draft report: "With half a century of democratic stability under our collective belts, the answer to these apocalyptic questions is almost certainly - no".

Three years ago, the apocalyptic possibilities existed, indeed, in theory only. Few could grasp the danger. In the words of Toeger Seidenfaden this morning, only the men and women who belong to the political elite did. But they get seldom elected to parliament BECAUSE they are in the elite.

If not so much for Estonia, or Latvia, or Lithuania, or the Ukraine - the collapse of the Soviet Union was a surprise for the West. It is a dangerous fallacy to think, just because the Soviet Union is no more, that the command economy, extensive economy and threat of aggression have also disappeared. Three years ago, perhaps, the nations of the USSR would have embarked gratefully on the path towards a free market economy, which, through hardship, would have taken them to democracy. After all, free market economy is nothing more than the right and obligation of individuals to take free decisions.

At my rare pessimistic moments it seems to me that this moment three years ago is lost. But is it really? No. The opportunity still exists to choose between the difficult road of democracy, and that of the agressive command economy, which promises only illusory gains. In order to help to choose, we need to understand the weight of the moral obligation we bear - the obligation that we are bearing today. Three years from now, it will be even harder for the peoples of the Russian Federation to make the right decision.

It may be too late to ask whether the Second World War can happen again. It seems to me that we have, with incredible unanimity, chosen to ignore the Third World War - a war which broke out with Soviet troops invading Manchuria in August 1945 with no particular reason, followed by communist coups and wars in Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Arabia, Africa and Nicaragua. If that was not a world war, ladies and gentlemen, then what is? We Europeans have failed to recognise this war because we are too Euro-centred. We see only wars that destroy cathedrals at Coventry, Cologne or Kiev. And we do not understand that sooner or later the shrug of our shoulder that we have given Rwanda's one million dead will come back to haunt us. The cycle of wars has never been broken. No one has ever bothered to count all the victims. And in one way or another, the reason behind all this bloodshed has been the violent redistribution of wealth.

We have been waiting for World War Three when it has already been waged. Are we sure that we can recognise World War Four? The forms it can take are legion. Some are lucrative for headline writers, but do not make us worry about the fate of democratic values. Naturally I am referring to the Tokyo Metro, to Oklahoma, to Yokohama. Democracy will lose this battle if it hides from nuclear or biological extortion or any other sophisticated terrorist attempt. Terrorism is not a pastime. Lenin, for example, was a professional terrorist and founded a state upon such tenets. Why, at the time when oil and electronics industries have become internationally integrated, do we underestimate the ability of terrorists to redistribute global resources?

I do understand the limits of democracy. And it is hard for EVERY national parliament to explain to the electorate why a state has to spend money outside its borders and sometimes even beyond the borders of its continent. But Marshall McLuhan's vision of the world as a global village is knocking on the door, even as the hedonistic European ponders whether to have turkey instead of the traditional pork roast for Christmas dinner.
Ladies and gentlemen of the Trilateral Commission, bon appetit!

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